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A phase encoded image is encrypted using the double random phase encoding technique, (DRPE). The
effects of using a variable dynamic range of phase distribution during phase encoding (pre-encryption)
are examined. We begin by phase encoding the input image using the full phase range, from p to p.
We perform numerically perfect encryption and we then introduce errors into the decrypting phase-keys
in the form of a pseudo-random distribution (position and phase) of incorrect pixels values. By quantify-
ing the resulting error in the attempted decryptions, for increasing amounts of error in the decrypting
phase-keys, we examine the effects of reducing the phase range to, +/ (p  D). In this way we attempt
to improve the phase encoding procedure for use with the DRPE technique. When the pixel values calcu-
lated, during an attempted decryption, fall outside the phase range used to phase encode the assigned
input image, we examine different methods of redistributing the value of that pixel to an assigned value
within the allowed phase range. The effects of the phase quantisation used in the keys are also examined.
 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction sible using current digital technology. Several optical encryptionPowerful desktop computers are becoming cheaper and more
readily available with the emergence of high-speed, multi-core
processors. This trend brings with it an increased demand for infor-
mation security and a continuing search for stronger encryption
algorithms. Two dimensional optical encryption, (or image encryp-
tion), has received much attention as an application of optical sig-
nal processing (OSP) [1–8]. The most apparent advantage of optical
based encryption systems are due to the natural 2D imaging capa-
bilities of optics and thus the inherent parallelism achievable with
OSP. They also boast high-speed, but require sensitive digital tech-
niques to recover the full wave-field information [9–12]. Another
advantage of optical encryption is the potential for a large key-
space [13], rendering brute-force methods of attack almost impos-ll rights reserved.
earch Cluster in Solar Energy
in 4, Ireland. Tel.: +353 (0) 1
n).techniques have been proposed [1] in the literature, however the
one that has received the most attention, and which is of interest
to us, is the random phase encoding (DRPE) technique [14].
Implementation of the DRPE technique involves the use of two
random phase masks, one in the input-image domain and the other
in the Fourier domain. If both phase masks are statistically inde-
pendent white noises then the encrypted output image is also a
stationary white noise [14]. In this study we will look at the DRPE
technique when the 2D input information is carried on the phase
front of the incident plane wave. In general it can be assumed that
if you phase encode the image, input to the DRPE technique, the
security of the system is improved [15]. To illustrate this point
we note that some of the most widely studied techniques [16,17]
for evaluating the security of DRPE exploit the redundancy of the
first, image-plane, phase-key, since this phase-key is not necessary
to the recovery of grayscale image intensity data. However, when
using a phase encoded input it is necessary to know both the im-
age-plane and the Fourier-plane phase-keys in order to access
the encrypted image data [15].
Our objective is to study how the initial method of phase encod-
ing the input image can affect the amount of error in the output
D.S. Monaghan et al. / Optics Communications 282 (2009) 482–492 483image, and determine if we can, in this way better understand and
improve on the performance of the phase encoded DRPE technique.
In a previous study on amplitude and phase encoding [15], the
phase encoded input-image was encoded to the phase range
[0 to +p] radians. Any so called ‘noisy phase’ value, arising during
an attempted decryption, that landed in the 3rd quadrant, i.e. (+p
to +3p/2] rad, of the unit circle, would get assigned to the value
p, and noisy phase value that landed in the 4th quadrant, i.e.
(+3p/2 to +2p) rad, would get assigned to 0. In this paper we will
examine the effects that a reduction in the phase range used has
during phase encoding, when attempting to decrypt the phase en-
coded image, i.e. the quantity and type of the resulting noise in the
decrypted image. We perform numerically flawless encryption and
then pseudo-randomly alter the value of an increasing number of
randomly positioned pixels in the decrypting phase-keys and note
the associated amount of error in the decrypted data. Then we de-
crease the phase range used to phase encode the input-image and
note the corresponding change in the error in the resulting de-
crypted image. Finally we look at three different methods of redis-
tributing noisy phase and the effect of each on the error in an
imperfectly decrypted image.
Important, in carrying out this study, is an understanding of the
effects of the number of levels of phase quantisation used in the
encryption keys. In order to examine these effects we vary the
number of quantisation levels in the keys. We show that, for an im-
age phase encoded and then encrypted using 256 phase levels,Fig. 1. A flow chart diagram of the encryption/decryption process andemploying keys with more that 16 levels produce little significant
effect in our results.
The paper is organised as follows in Section 2 we introduce the
phase encoding technique used in conjunction with the DRPE algo-
rithm. In Section 3 we present our error metric, the Normalised
Root Mean Squared, (NRMS), error, which is used to quantify the
difference between our decrypted image and our original data. In
Section 4 we discuss the phase quantisation of the phase-keys
and the effects, for different levels of noise, on the resulting NRMS
error as a function of this quantisation. In Section 5 we then turn to
the effects of the method of phase encoding used, (phase range, and
re-assignment technique), prior to encryption. The NRMS is used to
examine the phase encoding technique used and the effects of noise
in the decryption keys. The form of the resulting imperfectly de-
crypted output image noise is also examined. Finally in Section 6
a brief conclusion, outlining results and future work, is presented.
2. Phase encoding and encryption
The primary test image used through out this study is the gray-
scale Lena image [18]. It is a normalised 8-bit image with 256 gray
levels. In the standard case of phase encoding, the input image is
mapped to the phase range, i.e. where the normalised amplitude
in the range [0, +1] is mapped to 256 discretely quantised levels
in the phase range [p, +p). We phase encode the input-image,
fA(x, y), as follows:the NRMS calculation when using a phase encoded input image.
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where the subscript ‘P’ denotes that the input is a phase image, and
where 1=2 6 fAðx; yÞ 6 þ1=2. The phase-keys used, both the
encryption and the decryption keys, are quantised to 16 phase lev-
els, (see Section 4). The encryption and decryption processes are de-
scribed in Eqs. (2) and (3) as follows:
wðx; yÞ ¼ IfIfexp½þi2pfAðx; yÞ  exp½þi2paðx; yÞg
 exp½þi2pbðx; yÞg; ð2Þ
and
jfPðx; yÞj ¼ ArgðI1 I1fwðx; yÞg  exp i2pbðx; yÞ½ 
n o
 exp½i2paðx; yÞÞ
; ð3Þ
where a(x, y) and b(x, y) are the image-plane and Fourier-plane
phase-keys and fall in the limits 0 6 a 6 1 and 0 6 b 6 1. The
encryption and decryption processes are represented by a flow dia-
gram in Fig. 1. We note that when the input-image is phase encoded
its amplitude is uniform, which implies that each phase value lies
on the unit circle in the complex plane, i.e. jfPðx; yÞj ¼ 1 .0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
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Fig. 2. (a) The three curves in each graph look at phase encoding for the cases when the p
when both the encryption and the decryption keys are quantised to 4 phase levels, 2(b) is
phase levels.3. Error metric: NRMS
In this paper the encryption/decryption process is performed
numerically using a standard Matlab fast Fourier algorithm (FFT)
[19]. Each pixel in the phase-keys and images is represented by a
single complex value in a finite 2D array within the computer.
In doing so we neglect physical all modelling issues, e.g. polar-
isation and diffraction effects, Spatial Light Modulator (SLM) fill
factor, etc. [12,20,21]. Such simplifying assumptions are justified
because the aim of this study is to examine the nature of the DRPE
technique, and as such we are not concerned with errors intro-
duced due to the physical limitations of the optical system.
In order to calculate the Normalised Root Mean Squared
(NRMS) error of the output phase image, following an attempted
decryption, it is converted to a normalised amplitude image, where
the entire output phase range, i.e. a range of [0, 2p), is mapped to
the range [0, 1]. We note in this paper that no clipping or re-quan-
tisation of this output image is performed prior to the calculation
of the NRMS value. The resulting intensity at each pixel of this im-
age is compared to the corresponding pixel value in the original
normalised input image using the following equation:0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
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hase-keys, a(x, y) and b(x, y), are in error separately and at the same time. 2(a) is for
when they are quantised to 16 phase levels and in 2(c) they are both quantised to 64
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where Id(i, j) is the intensity of the (i, j) pixel in the decrypted image,
and I(i, j) is the corresponding pixel intensity in the original input
image. The NRMS error is thus used to quantify the amount of error
in an incorrectly decrypted image.
The NRMS error metric provides a direct measure of the Euclid-
ean distances between intensity images. Other error metrics do ex-
ist which can be used to provide estimates of the effects of noise
and key error [15]. Since it is the intensity of the decrypted data
that is the quantity of primary interest, and since it is intensity val-
ues that are measured during experiments, we believe the NRMS
provides useful insights. However it should be emphasised that
all the conclusions presented in this paper, regarding the relative
performance of the DRPE technique, have been arrived at based
on the use of the NRMS metric.
4. Phase quantisation in the keys
Before examining the effects of the phase range used during
phase encoding, we first study the effects of the number of quan-
tised phase levels used in the encryption/decryption keys. Assum-
ing that the normalised input image is phase encoded to 256 phase
levels we now ask how many phase levels can meaningfully be ap-
plied during encryption and decryption in the phase-keys.
Ignoring physical system constraints, one might expect that the
greater the number of phase levels available the greater the secu-
rity of the encryption achieved, since any attempt at decryption
will require that accurate information from a larger key-space is
needed to correctly decrypt the encoded information. To test this
hypothesis we simultaneously changed the number of phase levels
used in all the phase-keys, during encryption and decryption, and
attempted decryption with noise added to the decryption keys.
While a large range of quantisation values were examined by us,
in this paper we present results for three sample cases: (a) when+1 
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+/-
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Fig. 3. The blanked out arc in this diagram is not used during phase encoding. If,
following encryption and decryption, a pixel acquires a phase argument corre-
sponding to this angle range (regardless of its radial magnitude), the pixel will be
re-assigned a new value on the allowed part of the unit circle circumference by one
of the three methods illustrated in Fig. 7.4 quantisation levels were used in both the image and Fourier-
plane keys during both encryption and decryption, (b) when 16
levels were used, and (c) when 64 levels were used.
To examine this situation quantitatively using the NRMS we
proceed as follows: Our normalised 256 graylevel Lena image is
phase encoded to the phase range [–p, +p), (later in Section 5 we
refer to this as the D = 0 case). Following perfect encryption, at-
tempts are then made to decrypt the image using phase-keys con-
taining random quantised phase perturbations at random
positions. The results are presented in Fig. 2a–c.
In these figures the percentage of pixels that are in error are
plotted along the horizontal-axis and the associated NRMS error
is plotted along the vertical-axis. The three curves presented in
each figure correspond: First to the case in which the Fourier-plane
phase-key, b(x, y), has been corrupted and the image-plane phase-
key, a(x, y), is assumed correct, (this curve is denoted in the graph-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
Phase Range
N
um
be
r 
of
  p
ix
el
s
−π π + 
−π
+
−
+π
b
Fig. 4. (a) Shows the complex pixels values of an encrypted image for which D = p/
4 when phase encoding. An attacker, who acquired this image, would not be able to
distinguish whether it had been encoded using the entire phase range or a reduced
range. (b) Shows the corresponding pixel phase distribution.
486 D.S. Monaghan et al. / Optics Communications 282 (2009) 482–492by a circle). Second, when the image-plane phase-key has been
corrupted and the Fourier-plane phase-key is assumed perfect, (de-
noted by the square), and lastly when both of the decrypting
phase-keys have been corrupted, (the star). It should be noted that
for the case when both of the decrypting phase-keys are corrupted
that the percentage of pixels in error is taken as the sum of the per-
centage of pixels in error in both keys. For example, a point on the
curve denoted by the star, which is at 20% pixels in error is for the
case when 10% of the pixels are in error in both of the decrypting
phase-keys. We note that in all cases the incorrect pixel values
used during decryption were always quantised to the appropriate
number of phase levels.
Several trends can be observed in these figures. First, it would
appear that the decrypting Fourier-plane phase-key, b(x, y), is more
sensitive to incorrect pixel values as the NRMS error values tend to
increase rapidly to a higher value than in the other two cases [22].
Secondly, comparing the NRMS error values for the three different
key quantisation levels, i.e. 4, 16 and 64, we note that when the
number of levels is increased beyond 16 levels there is very little
change in the graphs, i.e. between Fig. 2b and c.0 10 20 30 40
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Fig. 5. These curves show the effect of variations in the size of the unused arc in phase en
arc region, the simulation were run three times for the Lena input, with the same keys, b
was performed using Method (iii). They differ as follows: (a) when only the decrypting F
a(x, y) is in error, and (c) when both decrypting phase-keys are in error. The vertical daThese calculations have been repeated for a number of different
input images and also for different DRPE random keys. In all cases
while the individual slope values and maximum values found dif-
fered slightly the trends observed were always identical. What this
indicates is that increasing the number of phase levels above 16
does not significantly increase the security of the encryption pro-
cess. Since there is no appreciable increase in the NRMS error met-
ric for increasing numbers of phase levels an attacker, who does
not know a priori the number of phase levels involved in encryp-
tion, can choose to assume 16 levels (4 bits per pixel) and will be
able to attack the encrypted data confident that equivalent accu-
racy can be achieved as with a more numerically intense 64 level
(6 bits per pixel) search.
For the interested reader we note that in a recent paper [22] we
have examined the effects of decreasing the number of quantisa-
tion levels used in the decryption keys following a perfect encryp-
tion. The results suggested that it is advantageous, when attacking,
to use an equal number of quantisation levels in both the image-
plane phase-key, a(x, y), and the Fourier-plane phase-key, b(x, y).
While these results are not theoretically definitive they are suffi-0 10 20 30 40
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
N
R
M
S 
Er
ro
r 
Percentage of pixels in error 
Δ = π /12 
Δ = π /4 
Δ = 0 
30 40
f pixels in error
Δ = π /12
Δ = π /4 
b
coding, shown in Fig. 3. To produce each curve, corresponding to different forbidden
ut different noises for each run. In all cases reassignment of forbidden pixel values
ourier phase-key, b(x, y), is in error, (b) when only the decrypting image phase-key,
shed line in (c) corresponds to decrypted examples in Fig. 8.
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the cases studied.−π Δ + 
−π
+π − Δ
+π
L(i) (i)R (ii) Both L & R 
(iii)R L(iii) 
Unit Circle Circumference
Reassigned PE Phase Range
Fig. 6. The shaded region here relates to the forbidden phase range from Fig. 3. The
values that are re-assigned from the left, (L) and right regions (R), are reassigned:
Method (i) to the nearest limits, Method (ii) reassigned with uniform probability to
a random quantisation value (dotted line), or using Method (iii) reassigned to a
quantisation values based on an exponential probability distribution function
(dashed line).
Fig. 7. Phase encoding is performed using Fig. 6a D = p/12, and Fig. 6b D = p/4. The
decryption process is performed assuming D = 0 in both (a) and (b). Note the non-
zero NRMS value at 0%.5. Phase encoding results
In this section we study the effects of the phase encoding range
used in conjunction with the DRPE technique. As in the previous
section, we perform numerically perfect encryption and then we
add increasing amounts of pseudo-random error to the two
decrypting keys, in the image and the Fourier planes. The resulting
NRMS values are then used to quantify the effects of the introduced
errors.
In the simulation presented in Fig. 2b we have mapped the
graylevel input image to 256 quantisation phase levels over the
phase range [p, +p). We now reduce this phase encoding range
symmetrically while maintaining the same number of phase-quan-
tisation levels in the input image. Fig. 3 shows the unit circle where
the blanked out arc indicates the part of the phase range that is not
used in the phase encoding of the original input image. The input
image is still phase encoded to 256 quantised levels but these
are now spread between the new phase range limits.
Fig. 4 shows the complex pixels values for an encrypted image
displayed in the complex plane. The associated input image was
phase encoded using D = p/4. Comparing phase encoded images
encrypted with D = 0 and D = p/4, we note that there are no dis-
cernable differences that would indicate what value of Dwas used.
Therefore an attacker, who acquired this encrypted image, would
not be able to simply identify D. Furthermore, even if attackers
are aware of the number of quantisation levels, i.e. 256, they will
not be aware of the exact quantisation values.
If, after decryption using a corrupted decryption phase-key, the
phase value at a pixel falls within the forbidden phase range, i.e.
the range not used during phase encoding, we propose to map
the value assigned to that pixel back to an allowed phase value.
In general, following decryption with keys which are in error, the
decrypted pixel values will no longer be at discrete quantised
phase values. In applying all of our reassignment techniques we as-
sume that during decryption it is known a priori what the quanti-
sation values are and mapping takes place to these quantised
levels.
We examine three different methods of re-assigning these new
values. We are only interested in the phase information of the out-
put image and this allows us to neglect any amplitude variations
and map all the pixel values to unity whilst maintaining the phase
angle.
InFig. 5a–c we examine the effects on the calculated NRMS val-
ues, of the size of the forbidden phase region used for one method
of reassignment. In all the cases examined, prior to encryption, the
normalised input images are mapped to the phase ranges [p +D,
+p  D], where D can have a value of [0, p/12, or p/4] as indicated.
During imperfect decryption pixels will acquire values within the
corresponding forbidden phase region. We examine how the ex-
tent of this forbidden phase region affects the NRMS results when
the decrypting phase-keys are corrupted. In Fig. 5a it is assumed
that random errors only occur in the Fourier-plane key, b(x, y).
Fig. 5b is for the case when errors occur in the image-plane key,
a(x, y), and finally in Fig. 5c equal percentages of random phase er-
rors are inserted into both keys simultaneously. In all cases, follow-
ing our results in Section 4, 16 quantised phase levels are used in
the encryption and decryption keys. Furthermore in all the cases
examined in Fig. 5 the forbidden phase values are reassigned using
an exponential probability function which we refer to as Method
(iii). All three reassignment methods are discussed later in this sec-
tion in detail, and are illustrated in Fig. 6. In all cases calculation of
the NRMS error then takes place following re-assignment.Fig. 7 is for the cases when phase encoding is performed using:
(a) D = p/12, and (b) D = p/4. However in the decryption process
we have assumed that D = 0, (no reassignment method is used),
which simulates the scenario of an attacker not being aware that
a non-zero D value was used in the phase encoding process. The
488 D.S. Monaghan et al. / Optics Communications 282 (2009) 482–492results indicate that the NRMS error levels are higher for keys with
small amounts of incorrect pixels, i.e. less than 10% pixels in error,
which would make an attack using heuristics methods more diffi-
cult. Significantly, even if the correct keys are used but D is un-
known, substantial error still occurs and for the cases examined
this error increases as D increases.
The three methods of re-assigning phase values examined.
Method (i) is the simplest method, and involved pixels with forbid-
den phase values, being reassigned to the nearest end points of the
allowed phase range. These end points are labelled L(i) and (i)R in
Fig. 6. Method (ii) involves forbidden pixel values being reassigned
values with equal probability. (randomly to one of the known
quantisation levels), on the allowed part of the circumference of
the unit circle. This is denoted by the dotted horizontal line in
Fig. 6. Method (iii), used above to produce Fig. 5, is also illustrated
in Fig. 6. In this case the forbidden pixel value is assigned to aFig. 8. With 10% of the pixels in error, as in indicated in Fig 5c. Noisyquantisation value based on a probability distribution function de-
noted by the dashed line. In this case the probability is assumed to
decrease exponentially as the value is reassigned further away
from its original value. In all cases assignment takes place with a
total probability of unity.
Fig. 8 shows the resulting decrypted Lena images following an
attempt to decrypt each of the three phase cases when 10% in total
of the pixels (shared equally between both keys) are in error. This
corresponds to the situation indicated by the dashed vertical line in
Fig. 5c. In all cases re-assignment is performed using Method (i). In
these images it can be seen that there are two distinct types of
noise. One of these noises is in the form of shot noise referred to
as ‘salt and pepper’ noise that is easily identified by its distinct
black and white spots, and can be easily removed with median fil-
tering [23]. The other is a Gaussian type noise and is more difficult
to remove with post-processing [23]. Both of these types of noisedecrypted images for three cases: D = (a) 0, (b) p/12, and (c) p/4.
D.S. Monaghan et al. / Optics Communications 282 (2009) 482–492 489are present in Figs. 8a–c. Later we will examine cases when the two
types of noise can be separately identified, for now we note that by
appropriate post-processing the image quality in these cases can
be improved.
In Fig. 9 we examine the effect on the NRMS of the three meth-
ods for re-assigning pixel values illustrated in Fig. 6. In all cases it is
assumed that D and the number of quantisation levels are known
during reassignment. Fig. 9a shows the three phase cases when
pixels with values in the forbidden phase region are re-assigned
to the value at the nearest limits, i.e. Method (i). Fig. 9b corre-
sponds to the case when they are assigned randomly to an allowed
quantised phase level, i.e. Method (ii), and Fig. 9c is the case when
they are assigned to an allowed phase value with exponentially
decreasing probability, i.e. Method (iii).
When incorrectly decrypted pixels acquire values that are in the
forbidden phase region we do not know what their correct phase
should be. Examining Fig. 9 it can be seen that re-assigning these
pixels to values using Methods (ii) and (iii) will in general produce
a lower NRMS error in the decrypted image than using Method (i).
This difference is most marked when errors are introduced in the
Fourier-plane key, b(x, y).Fig. 9. These graphs relate to Fig. 6 where: (a) is when value in the forbidden phase regio
random quantisation values, and (c) when they are assigned to a quantisation value bas
when the Fourier-plane decrypting phase-key is in error, the square denotes when the
decrypting phase-keys are in error.Fig. 10 shows an example of attempted decryptions, using
Method (i), when 10% of the decryption key pixels are in error.
The images correspond to the results indicated by the dashed ver-
tical line in Fig. 9a. The two different types of noise, commented
upon in Fig. 8, are produced by errors in the two decryption keys.
Fig. 10a, produced due to errors in the Fourier-plane key, contains
predominantly Gaussian type noise. Fig. 10b produced due to er-
rors in the image-plane key, contains predominantly shot or ‘salt
& pepper’ type noise. Both types of noise, (as in Fig. 8), are present
in Fig. 10c.
To further clarify our discussion of the effects of the phase
encoding method used in conjunction with the DRPE technique
and the types of noise observed, we now re-examine in a slightly
different way, the effects on the decrypted output of errors of
the decrypting Fourier key, b(x, y), for the case when D = p/4.
This corresponds to the zero error case in Fig. 5a in which re-
assignment is un-necessary. In Fig. 11a we show the resulting
output pixel values plotted in the complex plane, and in
Fig. 11b the distribution of phase values for the case when per-
fect, error free decryption is performed. The phase values are
quantised and none appear in the forbidden region. In Fig. 12an are assigned to the limits, (b) when they are assigned with uniform probability to
ed on an exponential probability distribution function. The circle denotes the case
image-plane decrypting phase-key is in error and the star denotes when both the
Fig. 10. These noisy decrypted images are for the three cases corresponding to the vertical dashed line in Fig. 9a. In each case 10% of the pixels are in error but in (a) Method
(i), in (b) Method (ii), and in (c) Method (iii) are used to reassign pixels with forbidden phase angles.
490 D.S. Monaghan et al. / Optics Communications 282 (2009) 482–492and b we show the corresponding figures when 2.28% of the pix-
els in b(x, y) are in error during decryption. This corresponds to
the cases examined in Figs. 5a and 7b prior to re-assignment of
the forbidden phase values. In Fig. 12a a variation in pixel ampli-
tudes and a filling up of the circle can be observed. In Fig. 12b a
smoothing of the distribution of phase values and the appear-
ance of values in the forbidden region can be seen. Finally in
Fig. 13a and b 10% of the pixels in b(x, y) are in error. The trends
observed continue, with further scrambling of the image
information.
The progressive degradation of the image data, in going from
Figs. 11–13, shows that, when the Fourier-plane phase-key is in er-
ror, the distribution of the pixel values tends to a Gaussian type
distribution. This, as we have noted, produces predominantly
Gaussian type noise in the decrypted Lena image, see Fig. 10a.When the corresponding series of figures are generated assum-
ing that only the image-plane key, a(x, y), is in error two significant
difference are observed. First, there is no change in the magnitudes
of the pixel values observed in the complex plane. The introduction
of the errors in the key does however result in a random filling in of
the forbidden arc, i.e. the forbidden phase region in the circumfer-
ence of the unit circle. Second, while increasing error smoothes the
distribution of pixel phase values, significant variations between
the number of pixel having adjoining phase values (similar to those
in the perfectly decrypted case), can be observed. The presence of
these sudden jumps is linked to the existence of the salt and pep-
per type noise, in the incorrectly decrypted Lena images discussed
earlier, see Fig. 10b.
Errors in both keys then lead to a combination of both types of
noise as observed in Figs. 8 and 10c.
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Fig. 11. (a) This is the output phase for perfect decryption when there are no errors
present in the decrypting phase-keys. (b) Shows a histogram of the distribution of
the pixels across the phase range. D = p/4.
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Fig. 12. (a) This is the output phase of a decrypted image 2.28% of the pixels in the
Fourier-plane decrypting phase-key are in error. (b) Shows a histogram of the
distribution of the pixels across the phase range. D = p/4.
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In this paper the DRPE technique, applied using phase encoded
input images, is examined in detail. In particular we wish to more
fully understand the effects of using a particular phase range dur-
ing phase encoding and the form of the noise produced during
incorrect decryption.
To perform this study we have shown that in this case increas-
ing the number of phase-key phase levels above 16 does not signif-
icantly increase the security of the DRPE technique, since there is
no appreciable increase in the NRMS error metric for increasing
numbers of phase levels, see Fig. 2. Therefore an attacker, who does
not know a priori the number of phase levels involved in encryp-
tion, can choose to assume 16 levels (4 bits per pixel) and will be
able to attack the encrypted data confident that equivalent accu-
racy can be achieved as with a more numerically intense 64 level
(6 bits per pixel) search.
We proceed by increasing the amounts of error in the decrypt-
ing phase-keys and quantifying the resulting increasing NRMS er-
ror in the output decrypted images. Using this procedure we
examine the effects on the NRMS error of reducing the phase range
from +/ p to +/ (p  D) during the phase encoding of the origi-nal input image. If identically encrypted phase encoded images are
compared, one using D = 0 and one using D = p/4, it is observed
that there is no discernable difference between the two random
encrypted outputs, see Fig. 4. Since an attacker cannot simply iden-
tify the D value used, or the corresponding quantised phase levels,
the introduction of D provides extra security. This point is empha-
sised as it is shown that even if both decryption keys are exactly
known, if D is assumed to be zero by an attacker then the larger
the actual value of D used, the greater NRMS error even if both
keys are known. See Fig. 7.
Examining the cases presented in Fig. 5, it is clear that introduc-
ing a D value makes the system more robust to noise for a valid
user. However, since changing the key values produce smaller
changes in the resulting NRMS error it also appears to make the
encryption system harder to crack by an invalid user.
We then proceed to examine three different methods of assign-
ing acceptable phase values to pixels which, following incorrect
decryption, have fallen outside the allowed phase range used to
phase encode the original input image. We labelled these three
re-assignment techniques Methods (i), (ii) and (iii), as illustrated
in Fig. 6. It is shown that re-assignment to the limiting forbidden
range values, as used in Ref. [15], produces higher NRMS values
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Fig. 13. (a) This is the output phase of a decrypted image 10% of the pixels in the
Fourier-plane decrypting phase-key are in error. (b) Shows a histogram of the
distribution of the pixels across the phase range. D = p/4.
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system by an invalid user. See Fig. 9.In Fig. 10 it is shown that the resultant noise appearing in the
decrypted images arising due to errors in the Fourier-plane phase-
key, b(x, y), lead primarily to Gaussian noise, while errors in the
image-plane phase-key, a(x, y), lead to ‘salt and pepper’ noise.
This is discussed in more detail using Figs. 11–13. It is indicated
that shot noise introduced by errors in the image-plane key can
be more easily eliminated using post-processing. It therefore
seems reasonable to suggest that during an attack, elimination
of shot noise in the decrypted image prior to calculation of the
NRMS error might allow efforts to be focused on the Fourier-plane
key.
From our results it is reasonable to make three recommenda-
tions. We suggest that it is advisable: (a) To use a D value when
encrypting in order to improve on the overall security of the en-
crypted image; (b) If D is known it is advantageous to an attacker
to use either Method (ii) or (iii) to reassign forbidden phase values;
and (c) An examination of the form of noise exhibited during a
known plain cipher text attack might be used to increase an attack-
ers chances of success.References
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